The MR makes reopening mines in Belgium and Europe a priority

Introduction

The mining question is no longer a peripheral topic, nor a debate reserved for geologists or extractive engineers. It has become a central issue of economic sovereignty, supply security, industrial competitiveness and the shift towards greater sustainability. Raw materials are immense markets that attract little attention from the media and the public, except for certain critical and strategic raw materials. And yet these raw materials are not a marginal segment of the modern economy: they are its invisible backbone. Without them, there are no batteries, no reinforced power grids, no solar panels, no wind turbines, no semiconductors, no advanced digital infrastructure. Without metallic and non-metallic raw materials, there are not even buildings, pavements, cars, or most of the objects that surround us every day.

The annual market value of global mining products is now estimated at around $2.2 to 2.3 trillion, compared to about $5.9 trillion for oil and gas, placing the mining industry on a strategically equal footing with fossil fuels.

Each Westerner consumes on average around 500 kg of steel and 10 kg of copper per year, and humanity consumes the equivalent of 500 Eiffel Towers of metal every day; at this rate, more metals will be consumed by 2055 than during the previous 70,000 years. We are entering a hyper-mineral world where the availability and control of resources are becoming as much an issue as energy.

The reopening of mines in Belgium and more broadly in Europe must therefore not be presented as a nostalgic return to the industrial past. It must be embraced as a clear-eyed response to a strategic vulnerability that has become too deep. Alongside the pursuit of strategic autonomy, this is also an ethical matter: lecturing other countries about the environment does not exempt us from taking our share in the extractive industry. The challenge is not to reproduce the extractive models of the past, but to build a 21st-century mining policy: technologically advanced, ecologically demanding, socially regulated and integrated into a complete value chain from exploration to recycling.

Driven by the Mouvement Réformateur, Wallonia took a first step by approving, on 24 March 2026, the new version of the National Exploration Programme (PEN), in order to map the strategic resources of its subsoil.

The National Exploration Programme is a strategy and planning document that organises, across the entire national territory, a series of geological, geochemical and scientific studies aimed at better mapping the strategic resources of the subsoil, in particular critical raw materials, in order to contribute to the European autonomy objectives set by the Critical Raw Materials Act, drawing on the use and modernisation of existing data, without prejudging any future mining activity.

Raw materials: the material foundation of our economy and the ecological transition

Every real economy relies on material flows. Finance, services, digital technology, defence, healthcare, transport and energy all depend, directly or indirectly, on mineral resources. The European Commission points out that non-energy raw materials are linked to all industries, at every stage of value chains, and that a smartphone can contain up to 50 types of metal. Raw materials are also irreplaceable in low-carbon technologies: they are needed for solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles and efficient lighting.

This reality is even more pronounced in the context of the energy and digital transition. Low-carbon technologies are extremely metal-intensive: copper and aluminium for grids, lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese for batteries, rare earths for permanent magnets, silicon and silver for certain solar technologies. A typical electric car requires around six times more materials than a combustion vehicle, and renewable technologies use 3 to 10 times more critical metals per installed MW than fossil or nuclear power.

International projections are striking: by 2050, demand for lithium could increase more than 40-fold, demand for graphite, cobalt and nickel by 20 to 25 times, and demand for rare earths by up to 7 times. In a scenario compatible with the Paris Agreement and carbon neutrality, low-carbon technologies would account for more than 40% of total demand for copper and rare earths by 2040, 60 to 70% for nickel and cobalt, and nearly 90% for lithium.

Demographic and urban dynamics are reinforcing this pressure: the world population is heading towards 9.7 billion people by 2050, with an expected urbanisation rate of nearly 68%, and annual material consumption per capita already ranges from under 3 tonnes in the poorest countries to over 25 tonnes in wealthy countries. Global steel production rose from around 189 million tonnes in 1950 to nearly 1,900 million tonnes in 2023.

Massive external dependence, especially on China

Europe has allowed a growing gap between its consumption of raw materials and its capacity to produce, process and recycle them. This decoupling has resulted in a deep and worrying strategic dependence. Five countries, China, the United States, Russia, Australia and India, together account for nearly 70% of all ore tonnages extracted (excluding construction materials), of which around a third comes from China alone.

This dependence is even more pronounced at the refining stage, where the real industrial value is created. For lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper and especially rare earths, China accounts for more than 50% of global processing capacity, and nearly 90% for rare earths. For heavy rare earths, the European Union is 100% dependent on Chinese imports, meaning any Chinese tightening poses a direct risk to the energy and digital transition.

Rare earths perfectly illustrate this imbalance. There are 17 of them, and they are at the heart of digital and renewable technologies: a 5 MW wind turbine can contain up to a tonne of magnets with 31% rare earths, a 7 MW offshore wind turbine requires more than a tonne of neodymium, and each person consumes an average of 17 g of rare earths per year. China currently extracts around 60 to 70% of rare earths, but refines about 90% of world production; the Bayan Obo mine alone produces nearly 45% of raw rare earths.

This concentration is not limited to rare earths. More than 90% of niobium comes from Brazil, and nearly 99% of boron from Turkey. The problem is not just geological scarcity, but the geopolitical concentration of extraction and refining.

The CRMA: a European turning point that demands action

The Critical Raw Materials Act, which came into force in 2024, marks a turning point in European raw materials policy. It aims to guarantee the Union secure and sustainable access to critical and strategic raw materials, enabling Europe to meet its climate and digital objectives while maintaining industrial competitiveness.

The CRMA sets binding quantitative targets for 2030:

• At least 10% of the critical raw materials consumed in the EU must be extracted on European soil,
• 40% must be processed in the EU, and
• 25% must come from recycling;
• No third country may supply more than 65% of the EU's annual consumption of a strategic raw material.

The CRMA identifies 34 critical raw materials, of which 17 are strategic.

The Commission has also designated strategic projects covering extraction, processing, recycling and substitution, representing several tens of billions of euros in investment. The CRMA provides for accelerated administrative procedures: a maximum of 27 months for extraction permits and 15 months for processing or recycling projects.^].

Europe's and Belgium's geological potential

Contrary to popular belief, most metals are not geologically “rare”. What is rare are well-identified, high-grade deposits that are actually being exploited. Modelling work on zinc shows that known reserves represent only a very limited fraction of the extractable potential.^].

Europe has significant deposits of rare earths, phosphates, lead-zinc, germanium and other strategic materials, but has largely abandoned exploration and mining. Belgium illustrates this paradox. The Critical Raw Materials Atlas of Belgium, edited by Sophie Decrée, highlights that our subsoil holds phosphate, lead-zinc and potentially germanium-rich deposits.

The Mons basin holds a very significant sedimentary phosphate deposit, with recoverable resources estimated between 47 and 96 million tonnes of P₂O₅ at grades of 5 to 10%. Drilling from the 1980s at Vieille Montagne in La Calamine and in Plombières still shows significant resources of zinc, lead and silver, along with germanium potential (a critical raw material).

Seabeds and deep sea mining

Given the immense current and future needs, resources on the ocean floor appear as a strategic deposit of the first importance. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone in the Pacific covers around 4.5 million km² and is estimated to contain more than 21 billion tonnes of polymetallic nodules. Research has also revealed muds enriched in rare earths and yttrium at concentrations far higher than those of certain land-based mines. Deep sea mining relies on remotely operated vehicles working at depths of several thousand metres. Prototypes such as Patania II, developed by DEME GSR, have already been tested in this context.

For an equivalent volume of metals produced, several arguments suggest that the environmental impact could be lower than that of many land-based mines: no deforestation, no explosives, no heavy roads, no massive tailings ponds. In this context, a global moratorium on the exploitation of polymetallic nodules would be a strategic mistake.

The need for a complete value chain and recommendations for action

Reopening mines only makes sense if this reopening fits into a much broader strategy. Extraction is just one link. To be relevant, it must be part of a complete value chain including exploration, mining, separation, purification, refining, metallurgy, eco-design, industrial manufacturing and recycling.

Priority solutions to reclaim Belgian and European mineral sovereignty

Clarifying the Belgian institutional framework

Belgium will not be able to pursue any credible policy on critical raw materials as long as the division of roles between the federal government, the Regions and the competent administrations remains unclear. Critical raw materials actually cut across the whole of public action: industry, energy, environment, foreign trade, defence, research, mobility, the circular economy. Today, however, this institutional fragmentation slows down decision-making, dilutes responsibilities and prevents the emergence of a coherent strategy. Yet the CRMA requires Member States to develop national exploration programmes, monitor strategic value chains and strengthen their resilience to supply disruptions. Belgium must therefore move away from a fragmented administrative logic towards coordinated national governance.

This institutional clarification is all the more urgent given that the European Union has set precise targets for 2030. These targets cannot be met if Belgium remains trapped in fragmented governance. A permanent mechanism for inter-federal coordination must therefore be established, with clear political responsibility, regular consultation between administrations and an explicit Belgian roadmap. In the field of mineral sovereignty, institutional ambiguity is no longer neutral: it becomes a direct factor of strategic powerlessness.

Creating a federal Observatory for critical and strategic resources

Belgium must equip itself with a genuine federal observatory capable of tracking all material flows, identifying industrial vulnerabilities and producing a medium- and long-term strategic vision. All countries that take this issue seriously have already equipped themselves with monitoring, tracking and anticipation tools. The CRMA indeed provides for a logic of supply chain monitoring, stress-testing, coordination of strategic stockpiles and risk assessment for technologies dependent on critical raw materials

Launch a systematic campaign to explore the subsoil

It is impossible to claim to reclaim mineral sovereignty without first properly understanding the national subsoil. This is precisely what the European Union is asking for: every member state must develop a national geological exploration programme targeted at critical raw materials. Yet Belgium has let this function wither for decades. The result is simple: we debate resources we barely know, we discuss investments without sufficient geological grounding, and we let uncertainty discourage industrial players in advance. A serious mining policy always starts with a knowledge policy.

However, this is no longer just a matter of theoretical recommendations: a first concrete translation of this strategy is already under way in Wallonia.

The momentum is indeed developing very concretely in Wallonia, where the Government has approved a new version of the National Exploration Programme, an essential step towards better identifying the strategic resources present in the regional subsoil. Based on a rigorous approach drawing on existing geological, geochemical and scientific data, this programme will allow targeted mapping of areas with potential, without prejudging any future exploitation. Of the six exploration zones defined at national level, five directly concern Wallonia, confirming the region's central role in this strategy. This progress, driven notably by the Mouvement Réformateur, marks a first concrete step towards a more ambitious mineral policy, based on knowledge, responsibility and preparation for the industrial future.

The data already available show, however, that this exploration is worth the effort. The Critical Raw Materials Atlas of Belgium, edited by Sophie Decrée, confirms the existence of indications and deposits of interest in Belgium, notably in phosphates, lead-zinc systems and associated germanium occurrences. The Mons basin thus holds the second largest sedimentary phosphate deposit in Europe, and areas such as Plombières or the Vieille Montagne in Kelmis still hold notable resources. Funding is therefore needed for a modern campaign of geophysical surveys, mapping, core sampling and data analysis. Prospecting does not automatically mean exploiting; it means giving oneself the right to know. And without this knowledge, no serious investor will take the risk of reindustrialising Belgium in this field.

Reform the Walloon mining code

The Walloon legal framework must be revised so that it stops being an implicit brake on any mining revival. The Walloon decree of 14 March 2024 establishing the Code for the management of subsoil resources in Wallonia came into force on 1 July 2024, with the ambition of more clearly regulating the exploration and exploitation of underground resources. In principle, this is progress: Wallonia finally recognises that subsoil management deserves a specific, structured and modern framework. But in practice, numerous critics agree that the mechanism remains too cumbersome, too little operational and insufficiently attractive for exploration.

The problem is not that strict rules exist; the problem is that a poorly calibrated framework can discourage initiative even before the first drilling campaign. A mining sector will not be revived in an uncertain legal environment, where timeframes are too long, procedures are ill-suited to the realities of exploration, and the signals sent to investors are ambiguous. The code must therefore be rewritten in the spirit of responsible mining: a clear single point of contact, timeframes compatible with industrial requirements, legal certainty, high environmental standards, transparency, financial guarantees, local participation and an explicit link with the downstream value chain. A good mining code is neither a licence to do anything nor a machine for blocking everything: it is a demanding framework that makes action possible

Deploy pilot projects on identified deposits

The mining revival will gain neither credibility nor acceptability if it remains at the level of principles. It must translate into a few carefully chosen, rigorously regulated and technologically exemplary pilot projects.

Pilot projects have a threefold value. First, they make it possible to verify the economic reality of resources using contemporary methods. Second, they make tangible what a 21st-century mine looks like: automated, measured, monitored, subject to strict environmental criteria. Finally, they help build social acceptability through proof rather than slogans. A well-conducted pilot project, accompanied by transparent communication, independent scientific monitoring and genuine local consultation, can demonstrate that there is a path between abandoning all extraction outright and returning to past practices. It is through example that the public debate will evolve.

In this respect, the launch of Wallonia's mining exploration campaign in May 2026 is a good decision. It will allow better understanding of the already recorded but little-known mining indications and will improve the maps and our understanding of our subsoil.

Structure processing and recycling supply chains

Opening or reopening mines without rebuilding the downstream industrial links would be a strategic mistake. Real value is created in processing: separation, purification, refining, metallurgy, component manufacturing, recycling. If Europe continues to extract too little, process too little and recycle without sufficient critical mass, it will remain dependent on the countries that control the industrial downstream, first and foremost China. Belgium must therefore think in terms of a complete value chain, not merely debate the opening of mines.

It indeed has real assets for this. Initiatives such as Circular Wallonia, Reverse Metallurgy or R&D projects related to batteries, non-ferrous metals and construction materials show that Wallonia and Belgium already possess building blocks of expertise in recycling, metallurgy and the circular economy. The challenge now is to connect these skills to a broader mineral strategy. Supply chains must be structured by groups of elements: for example zinc-lead-germanium, copper, or battery metals, in order to create coherent industrial ecosystems. Without extraction, recycling remains insufficient to meet demand. Without refining, extraction merely shifts dependency elsewhere. Without an integrated chain, there will be neither sovereignty nor sustainable reindustrialisation.

Prevent the export outside the EU of waste containing critical raw materials

Europe is today making a major strategic mistake by allowing waste rich in critical metals to leave its territory, which then becomes a resource for competing powers. The CRMA explicitly calls on member states to improve the collection of waste rich in critical materials, ensure its recycling and also examine the potential for recovery from extractive waste. As long as these flows leave the Union, Europe is depriving itself of an essential secondary deposit. In practice, it is financing the consolidation of other powers' value chains, at the very moment it claims to want to reclaim its industrial sovereignty.

The export outside the EU of waste containing rare earths or other critical raw materials must therefore be banned, or at the very least very strictly regulated. This measure must be accompanied by improved traceability, increased customs controls, better collection of batteries, electronic equipment and end-of-life vehicles, and support for scaling up European recycling capacity. This is not merely an environmental measure; it is a matter of economic and geopolitical security.

Conclusion

Belgium and Europe have reached a moment of truth. The energy transition, digitalisation, the defence of the industrial base and the assertion of strategic autonomy all require secure access to critical raw materials. The European Union has recognised this reality and set a clear course through the CRMA.

To continue refusing the mining question would amount to maintaining a dangerous hypocrisy: wanting tomorrow's technologies without accepting the materials that make them possible. The reopening of mines, when part of a strategy of exploration, innovation, processing, recycling and high environmental standards, is not a step backwards. It is a condition for European sovereignty, a requirement of ecological coherence and an industrial urgency.